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spectacle" to that end. Mizejewski's micro-analysis is insightful; Kibler's study, 
however, offers a more gripping account of female performers in the early 
twentieth century. Her rendering is more sure-footed historically when she 
explores the intersection of high and low culture and discusses that era's gender 
and racial discourses. Kibler's examination of the vaudeville audiences is 
unique, and her material vividly reveals how female performers, both on stage 
and off, contested the status quo of power relations. 
Fred Nadis 
University of Texas 
Democracy and the Colonial Heritage in Africa: 
Revisiting Mamdani's Citizen and Subject 
Mahmood Mamdani's Citizen and Subject has become one of the most talked- 
about contributions to African studies in recent years. The review article which 
follows represents a commentary on Mamdani. It amplifies substantially a 
short review which has been published previously in the African Sociological 
Review. That review ventured to make a number of critical comments on the 
book which dispute some of its emphases while elaborating on its themes. This 
article will attempt to develop these points somewhat further. The idea, 
however, is not to take away from the value and significance of Mamdani's 
book which represents an important and original contribution. 
Others have in fact disputed its originality. As history, Mamdani's 
concentration on "decentralised despotism," in effect the indirect rule systems 
that were in force during much of the colonial period, is of course not original. 
There are accounts still worth reading that understood this system well, 
perhaps the more so for being close to the colonial period in time, such as 
Thomas Hodgkin's Nationalism in Colonial Africa, Michael Crowder's West 
Africa under Colonial Rule or William Derman's Serfs, Peasants and 
Socialists. It has long been known that the French, who were rather 
uninterested in questions of legitimacy, would occasionally turn a favoured 
cook into a chef du canton just as they later turned Bokassa into a president 
and emperor. Even for South Africa, a number of writers have looked at the 
subject, with David Welsh's study of the Shepstone system in Natal a 
particularly important pioneering volume. Norman Etherington is one 
historian who long ago recognised Natal specifically as an influence on the 
colonial state emanating out to the rest of (at least) British Africa. 
But Mamdani, as he has had to point out repeatedly, is not really trying to 
compete with the historians. He is instead doing what they do so rarely, apply 
their wisdom effectively and systematically to contemporary problems. In this 
case, his work is really directed towards the 1990s debate on democratisation 
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in Africa. It stems from Mamdani's frustrations at the glib and superficial 
institutional prescriptions of the Washington consensus that seem irrelevant to 
African reality. Methodologically he poses against these positivist dogmas, 
surviving with surprisingly little development from the classic modernisation 
literature, the weight of lived process. Democratisation cannot exist outside of 
this process; it has to be an effective intervention into the political 
consciousness and political lives of people with a real history. 
It also reflects his awareness that the "civil society" movements aimed at 
authoritarian regimes in Africa have been heavily based on the urban middle 
class. Demands on their part for elections, a free press, constitutional 
guarantees, are significant but it is less clear how they can have an impact on 
impoverished rural people. The problem of authoritarian rule in their lives lies 
elsewhere. The limited success of liberal reform in some African countries and 
total failure in others, has often stemmed from failure to engage the rural 
masses and their problems. Shrewd politicians such as Biya in Cameroun, 
Eyadema in Togo and Moi in Kenya have been able to turn their patrimonial 
followings against the reformers effectively. Mamdani wanted to establish 
some kind of analysis that could bring to bear the limitations of these 
movements as well as the real lives of the African population. How can they 
too become citizens? As such his intervention is both timely and critically 
important. 
Having said this, however, I am skeptical of whether it is really possible to 
jump as quickly as does Mamdani from the subjects and citizens of colonial 
despotism to the current problems of the African countryside. I think too much 
water has run under the bridge. Mamdani recognises of course that, 
particularly in radical states, authoritarian indirect rule gave way to 
authoritarian direct rule where peasants were administered from the capital in 
the hopes of rapid development and forced modernity. He tells us that "no 
nationalist government was content to reproduce the colonial legacy 
uncritically. Each sought to reform the bifurcated state that intentionally 
crystallized a state enforced separation, of the rural from the urban and of one 
ethnicity from another. But in doing so each reproduced a part of that legacy, 
thereby creating its own variety of despotism." (8) These episodes may have 
been sufficiently profound, in fact, to make it impossible to return to earlier 
circumstances or to isolate out the decentralised despotism component, even in 
countries that have never really experienced a radical pressure from the centre. 
One obvious task that Mamdani indirectly proposes is the need to revisit 
regimes like those of Nyerere, Nkrumah and Sekou Tour6 with new questions 
stemming from the problematic of African democracy. What Mamdani has told 
us is one important part of reconstructing a democratic itinerary but it is not 
the whole story. 
In fact, the relationship between centre and periphery has become far 
more complex and intertwined. Are rural Africans today held down largely by 
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the power of their chiefs and the weight of custom? If we look at the work of 
.A.E. Afigbo on the warrant chiefs of eastern Nigeria, a particularly blatant case 
of colonial political make-believe, we find that these chiefs won a remarkable 
amount of legitimacy fairly quickly despite their lack of respectable origins. In 
effect, a social process from below of considerable complexity was certainly at 
work already in the first generation after conquest. In Senegal, it was precisely 
when Ltopold Senghor, the ultimate citizen, reached out from the world of the 
quatre communes to establish effective linkages with Muslim brotherhoods 
influential among them suggests that his political power waxed mightily. This 
was paralleled by successful African nationalists all over the continent. 
Struggles of resistance in the countryside, less frequent than one might expect, 
were rarely unambiguously anti-chief even if they often held out some ideal of 
legitimacy from custom and the past. These are West African examples and 
certainly it is harder to disentangle the two colonial realms there even 
historically, let alone today. In West Africa, cities are very much less colonial 
creations and the mix of indirect and direct rule does not divide so neatly into 
the rural and the urban. The long history of coastal intermediary trading strata 
based in towns with a capacity to reach both towards colonial and indigenous 
social and political forms is important and was never entirely effaced. In 
general, it is much harder to separate out the subject and the citizen, despite the 
terminology originating from the French colonial system in this region and the 
efforts of the colonial regimes. 
However, if we turn elsewhere, distinctions are also not so neat. As a 
recent study of rural Zimbabwe by William Munro, aware of Mamdani's work, 
points out, interventions from the central state there did not unambiguously 
build up the power of customary rulers. Munro sees these interventions as a 
succession of failed hegemonic projects. But the issue is not only one that 
exists in the political realm. I would argue that the creeping influence of the 
money economy, occasionally propelled by the sudden infusion of capitalist 
investment, as well as all kinds of contradictions inherent in the indirect rule 
project, is also operating under the political surface. Land rights, often 
assumed to be the most important prerogative of "traditional authority" 
(Mamdani, 17) are in reality almost everywhere a kind of mish-mash in which 
capitalist market values and various interpretations of customary law are 
mixed up. Attempts by the state to create a consistent and logical new land 
tenure system, notoriously for instance in Kenya from the time of the 
Swynnerton Plan in the 1950s and 1960s, have generally been subverted from 
below by the most successfi~l rural accumulators whose ambitions are socio- 
political as well as economic. I am not sure how far the reconstruction of the 
"White Highlands" under Kenyatta can be elucidated through applying 
Mamdani's ideas on rural despotism. The logic of commons enclosure in 
classic capitalist form has tended to elude rural Africans even in this very 
commercialised zone - and yet they hardly just cling to an age-old past at the 
104 Left History 7.1 
feet of their elders. 
"The line between those who labor on the land and those who do not" (61) 
is being crossed by ordinary people in their millions every day, both men and 
women, and on journeys that reach across international bamers and even 
continents. And they are crossing it in ways that are messy and highly 
confusing to us social scientists. Munro looks to writers such as Michael Watts 
and Sara Berry who emphasise the limited capacity of the state to order the 
countryside - "inconclusive encounters" in Berry's terms (Munro, 363) - 
and the confusing and original mix of rights that are typical of contemporary 
Africa. Mamdani himself, whose research on these issues for Uganda is 
extremely interesting, refers to a "gulf between what is legal and what is real." 
(135) 
Jean-Fran~ois Bayart, of course, has suggested that the reality does not 
tend to approach, as Mamdani proposes, a more or less deracialised form of 
the old authoritarian system but rather the irregular growth of a rhizome-like 
political culture where something neither modern nor customary flourishes 
largely underground. Unlike some Africanists, who enjoy celebrating this 
remarkable exotic as a sign of African originality and initiative, I suspect that 
it represents a powerful barrier to economic and social development beyond a 
certain level. Perhaps the truth lies in between, or in both Bayart and Mamdani. 
There may be rather a value in understanding the mosaic of differently derived 
values and strategies in line with the experience of Europe in the centuries of 
movement towards capitalism, although of course Africa benefits or suffers 
from being part of a world where capitalism has as a whole already triumphed, 
making original solutions on the ground far more difficult to prevail. 
Mamdani evaluates decentralised despotism to some extent in terms of its 
counterweight, resistance from the masses. The resistance, however, such as 
the Rwenzururu movement, often reproduced the social forms which Mamdani 
deplores. In part, this reflects the fact that these social forms were not simply 
imposed from on top; they were also created in an organic way from below. 
Rural society, as he acknowledges, became stratified and often highly 
exploitative internally. In part, studying the limits of resistance reflects the 
necessity of any way forward engaging a wider horizon than that of any 
specific rural area. As Mamdani himself stresses, popular rural mass 
movements readily become ethnically or religiously specific and reach out only 
with difficulty to a wider audience. In summary, Mamdani's contribution is 
vital but only part of what we need to consider in order to map out the potential 
for democratisation in Africa in the twenty first century. He does not put 
enough weight on post-decentralised despotism and the ways in which the 
colonial structures have evolved (or decayed) in looking at contemporary 
problems. 
Mamdani argues that decentralised despotism is modelled on South 
African systems of segregation which in turn gave way to apartheid. He 
Reviews 105 
suggests that apartheid was in fact the less ambiguous form of indirect rule that 
was finally imposed on black South Africans, given its greater ruthlessness and 
consistency. Malung this connection is an important and valuable one and it 
certainly offers one way of integrating, or perhaps re-integrating, South 
African scholarship into the African mainstream. Here again, however, I feel 
that he has perhaps elided too many historic and sociological layers that require 
attention in jumping from the Shepstone and equivalent systems to the mid- 
twentieth century if what one wants is a window clearly viewing the South 
African conundrum as a whole. 
In South Africa, the Shepstone system was arguably not the dominant state 
system. What was dominant was the world the whites created for themselves 
where the state focused on an elected and relatively internally-democratic 
parliament and the sustenance of a conventionally hegemonic capitalist society 
with appropriate institutions. This is why the formidable Dame Margery 
Perham, to whom Mamdani gives a bit of attention, disliked South Africa so 
intensely when she visited it; it represented a direct slap in the face to her 
beloved tropical trusteeships to the north for whom she was a great 
propagandist and theorist. The dominance of the white centre reflects the far 
greater efficacy and internalisation of capitalist forms, institutions and ideas in 
the society. South African "exceptionalism" can be an excrescence of a racist 
mindset but it is up to a point a required way of comprehending South Africa 
to the extent that one takes the idea of capitalist transformation and a capitalist 
mode of production seriously as analytical tools. It is not merely a piece of 
chauvinistic arrogance. 
The analogies of South African pre-1948 Native Affairs Department 
administration, inconsistent, underfinanced and pragmatic as it was, and 
indirect rule elsewhere in Africa, are rather closer than when one interposes the 
apartheid system. It is true that apartheid was about consolidating homelands 
into "national" ethnic states in which chiefs were turned into politicians. But 
was the real heart of the South African system the homelands? Ivan Evans' 
recent book, Bureaucracy and Race, brings back with considerable rhetorical 
elegance the world of "native administration" in the 1950s. This work 
supplements the well-known studies of Hindson, Pose1 and Mabin and re- 
enforces the point that the most important thing about apartheid was what 
happened in South African cities. Evans does see the pre-apartheid state in 
South Africa as operating along the lines of decentralised despotism but the 
massive construction of townships in the cities for blacks under the auspices of 
the National Party represented an acknowledgement of the necessity of some 
kind of stable black labour force for the system of capital accumulation to 
work. Joyless, soulless, created at minimum expense, these townships were 
intended neither for citizens nor subjects. Evans poses instead the model of a 
kind of administrative dictatorship often oiled by corruption, the originator of 
the "world's largest finger-print collection." (91) As Mamdani says, apartheid 
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urban policies represented a "frontal assault on the residual rights of the 
African population." (1 02) In fact it is the impossible social position in which 
this placed black South Africans that shaped the character of resistance to 
apartheid in the 1970s and later. 
At first, the state was able to effectively block that resistance, led primarily 
by township bred school pupils, through the angry counterweight of migrant 
workers just as the Mamdani thesis predicts. That is essentially how the 1976 
insurrection was put paid. But by the middle 1980s, not only was this no longer 
effective but resistance was spreading to more and more remote parts of the 
country. Although it is somewhat crude as historical analysis, there is much 
truth in Harold Wolpe's analysis, based on the theory of articulating modes of 
production, that the older system in South Africa was breaking down. By the 
1980s even the countryside wasn't really the countryside anymore with any 
genuine peasant economic basis for existence. Apartheid was about shoring 
things up - and it failed. It looked especially menacing and potentially 
triumphant when it coincided with the unprecedented boom in world trade 
during the decade of the 1960s. Yet through most of its era, up to 1960 or 
thereabouts and then again in the reform phase from the middle 1970s, it was 
transparently shot through with compromise and contradiction, whatever the 
Strijdoms and Verwoerds found it comforting to tell the white public on the 
hustings when election time came around. Although sometimes glamorised 
internationally, black mass resistance to the South African system reflected 
very closely the harsh conditions of life in townships and Bantustans, 
brutalized, violent and anti-social. The defenders of indirect rule, even though 
they were in part decent people with a cohesive outlook, were beaten back in 
extremely violent ways. In the section of his hook dealing with the transition 
years, Mamdani has presented us with a picture of reactionary violence set into 
motion by a weakening security state as it looked in the early 1990s, a picture 
which in and of itself was a very valuable research exercise. But there was 
never much chance for this to derail the thrust towards creating a world of 
"citizens" in South Africa. 
With difficulty, the initiative of the youths has been tamed and driven from 
visibility in rural South Africa since 1994 and normality with strong affinities 
to the past tentatively restored. The ANC has certainly compromised with rural 
social power structures, some of which directly influenced the party while 
others operate as part of the legal opposition. In a recent election time speech, 
outgoing President Nelson Mandela pointed out that "democracy had brought 
a better life for traditional leaders . . . and acknowledged the role they can play 
in building a nation." He viewed electoral democracy and "traditional 
authority" as two political traditions to be "mamed" in the context of the 
installation ceremony of a conservative chief in the Transkei. (Business Day, 
19 April 1999) However, even this was described vaguely as being "something 
relevant: particularly in the rural areas." Nationally, the Inkatha Freedom Party 
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of Mangosuthu Buthelezi, which represents the main voice of this older world 
typically confined to one large ethnic entity, that of the Zulus, is part of the 
Government of National Unity. But these voices are unlikely indeed to be the 
directive ones in the new South Africa. If the ANC falters or becomes 
ineffective, it is more likely urban demagogues than rural patriarchs who will 
challenge the ruling party - Winnie Mandela rather than Mangosuthu 
ButheleiThe big threat to democracy today comes far more from the threats 
posed by a deracinated, more or less urbanised world in which neither 
subjectship or citizenship is accessible to the population rather than what 
remains of "the structures of indirect rule7' in South Africa. (32) 
In summary, the difference between Mamdani and myself is probably 
twofold. On the one hand, I think there is too quick a leap between his strong 
characterisation of the colonial period and the complexities of the present. On 
the other, I place analytically a greater emphasis on political economy rather 
than authority and the state. I would stress not only political and social layers 
which have sedimented since 1960 but also on the dissolving power of 
capitalism - weak in Africa generally as Anne Phillips has perhaps pointed 
out most effectively for the high colonial period - but strongest in South 
Afnca. Phillips emphasises that the preservation of indirect forms of control 
and older social and economic structures in West Africa was essentially a mark 
of defeat and disillusion with a capitalist project on the part of colonial 
ideologues and administrators. The more gradually dissolving effects of 
capitalism elsewhere in Africa also need consideration, difficult as they may be 
to pin down to a particular time sequence. If Phillips is correct in pointing to 
colonialism's failure in erecting cornerstones for the systematic erection of a 
capitalist system, the role of the cash nexus in all its ramifications as a solvent 
cannot be underestimated if one takes the long view. The older Africa of 
coherent peasant households and structured hierarchies that suited colonial 
rulers is in growing disarray. In another generation, the majority of Africans 
may actually be city dwellers. 
Only in cases where "traditional" forms enshrined by colonialism have 
been unusually successful in surviving, such as that of Swaziland, do I think 
that the key to African democracy might lie in a direct assault on 
"decentralised despotism." Even here, it is hard these days to forget that the 
unfolding problematic of Rwanda contained an important stage, consonant 
with the granting of independence, which involved a successful Hutu revolt 
from "feudalism," the local form of decentralised despotism, as preserved and 
protected by Belgian colonialism. Its resolution, by creating a potent refugee 
problem and resting the legitimacy of the new Rwandese state on the 
extirpation of the older order of things locally, bred a new and fatal dilemma 
for the future. The example of Rwanda makes me doubt that a break with 
feudalism or despotism alone takes us all the way. Finally, as Africa becomes 
more "hybrid," to use a fashionable term, it is also less clear to me why what 
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Mamdani terms the commonality of Africa (3 1) need be so important today as 
an intellectual subject. On the contrary, integrating Africa andlor its constituent 
parts into world history and development seems a more important project than 
ever. We need to beware African exceptionalism! I suspect, however, that 
Mamdani and I would largely agree on what is now needed - a democracy 
that is tied in to expanding opportunities for security, development and 
accumulation through the broad population whose rights cease to be arbitrary, 
key emphasis on the transformation of the African countryside and the 
democratisation of local government but in conjuncture with the creation of an 
effective and consistent national state system. "In the absence of a wider 
strategy of political change and social transformation, the empowerment of 
local communities can be of only limited and temporary significance." (2 17) 
Bill Freund 
University of Natal 
Radical Writing on Painted Walls 
Anthony W. Lee, Painting on the Left. Diego Rivera, Radical Politics, and 
San Francisco$ Public Murals (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1999). 
When it comes to modem art of the Americas, perhaps no single artist has 
been such a constant point of reference and praise for liberal and leftist 
scholars than Diego Rivera. From such moderate assessments as those of Dawn 
Ades and Laurence Hurlburt to the explicitly leftist positions of David Craven 
and Alicia Azuela, art historians have viewed Rivera's monumental murals, 
their patronage, and their reception as touchstones for assessing the critical 
potential of art to participate in the major political struggles that occurred 
between the world wars. Such a tradition extends back to the heated and 
impassioned belief of contemporary writers in the twenties and thirties who 
saw cultural policy as part and parcel of left-wing political practice, however 
ambivalently such a position was embraced by the Communist Party and other 
factions of the left. (Trotsky's celebratory assessment of Rivera comes to mind 
as a prominent example.) Certainly there are other examples of critical artists 
before Rivera; but the complexity and contradiction of Rivera's work (not to 
mention the uproar that seemed to surround every mural he produced for 
capitalist patrons in the United States) continues to draw more attention to this 
artist than to others as a means of exemplifying how art can actually function 
within a broader radical political process. If there ever was an iconic leftist art 
production, then Rivera is your man to explore its potential and its limitations. 
Or so it would seem. But Anthony Lee, in his new volume on public 
